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Abstract
Purpose – The aim of this research is to make users aware of the importance surrounding the issue of 
security and security awareness while at the same time making educators as well as other individuals 
aware of the differing effects of cultural dimensions into the learning process.
Design/methodology/approach – An inter-cultural study was conducted to investigate if users from the 
USA and Taiwan exposed to the same situational awareness learning would have different performance in 
those security awareness outcomes.
Findings – The findings confirm that American users who received the situational learning outperformed 
those users who received the traditional face-to-face instruction. Taiwanese users did not perform 
significantly differently between these two treatments.
Research limitations/implications – The study was only focused on two countries and therefore may limit 
its implications worldwide. But the study does show that global citizens also react differently to security 
awareness as would be expected due to differing cultures. Certainly, awareness of the risks and safeguards 
is the first line of defense that can be employed by any individual, but how individuals address these risks 
can be very dissimilar in different cultures. Therefore, the implications are apparent that the issue of 
security awareness should be studied from different cultural perspectives.
Originality/value – This paper offers original findings and value into the investigation of whether or not 
situational security awareness training is culturally-bounded
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1. Introduction
Security awareness training of general users is negligible in many developing and 
under-developed countries. Additionally, the diffusion of the Internet and prevalent 
social technologies in both of these aforementioned types of countries impose grave 
threats to information security. 
Security awareness involves the human factor. No matter how advanced and 
stringent the security technological solutions, humans are generally the first line of 
defense to secure information assets. Security breaches, such as virus infections, 
identity theft, and dumpster diving, are the direct cause of carelessness and a lack of 
knowledge and action on the part of users. Technological solutions are effective 
only after users are knowledgeable and skillful at using them. Therefore, security 
awareness can be more important than the technology factor in contributing to the 
success of today’s information security. 
Thus, cultivating security awareness in relation to an individual, a corporate, and 
on a global basis is a prerequisite to a more secure and protected world within the 
realm of information. A 2006 information security breaches survey found that the gap 
between the companies that have high security awareness and those that did not is 
widening (PriceWaterHouseCoopers, 2006). This gap may be explained in the fact that 
the larger enterprises spend more time in developing security policies, training, and 
institute proactively security measures such as anti-virus software. In the same logic, 
one effective approach to better secure a person’s information is to make individuals as 
well as organizations more aware of security risks and their responsibilities. 
In general, security awareness programs provide users adequate knowledge to 
evaluate adverse consequences of security problems and take the appropriate actions 
to prevent and correct security breaches. International firms, such as DaimlerChrysler 
(Grant, 2007), consider security awareness of their employees as one of key 
performance indicators to their successful operation. Members of the European 
Network and Information Security Agency, representing 67 government departments 
and private companies in nine European countries are actively conducting internal and 
external auditing to assess their actual state of security awareness (Filipek, 2007). 
Although different countries may have different states of security awareness, the 
increase of security awareness of their national, corporate and citizen safety is 
unequivocally important for all countries. It is imperative that general users of all 
cultural backgrounds receive proper security awareness training in order to reduce 
security risks to themselves and to others. 
Different parts of the world have varying technological capacities and security 
challenges. Though this may be the case, improving the level of security awareness of 
general users is equally important in every scenario and must be addressed 
immediately. This study will investigate the efficacy of web-based information 
security awareness programs from a cross-culture perspective. Subjects from Taiwan 
and the USA participated in our web-based programs which were created to enhance 
their security awareness knowledge level. Both pre- and post-tests were given in order 
to assess whether these aforementioned cultures would be more receptive to the use of 
technology-driven security awareness programs. 
2. Literature review
2.1 The importance of designing a culturally-aware security awareness training 
program 
Culture is the “collective programming of the mind” to distinguish among people of 
different countries, according to social anthropology theories (Hofstede, 1991, p. 25). 
Culture is also defined as the habitual method of doing things over time. Therefore, culture 
is the product of learning, rather than of inheritance (Hofstede, 1993). Competitive 
strategies, educational systems, training approaches, symbols, values, perceptions of job 
security (Probst and Lawler, 2006), choice of IT applications (Agrawal et al., 2003) and 
managerial approaches are a few manifestations of national culture within an 
organization. Culture influences also include acceptable ways to process information, 
such as labeling, languages, and symbols (Triandis, 1991). Moreover, culture defines an 
individual’s societal role and prescribes guiding principles to security threats reactions. 
 
 
 
 The culture has influenced the formation of many security measures, such as national 
security policy, information ethics, security training, and privacy issues. According to 
Floridi (2006), privacy as an example is more oblivious to people in the collectivism society 
than to people in the individualism society. For instance, one study indicated that the 
German people view privacy is an instrument to protect one’s private autonomy and to 
give that person the freedom to express one’s will (Ess, 2006). To people in Hong Kong and 
China privacy protection does not mean that citizens have the right of being autonomous. 
As a result, Chinese citizens in those two countries enjoy comparatively limited protection 
of data privacy in the area of e-commerce, in comparison with Germans and Americans. 
Therefore, it is imperative to incorporate the culture into the design of IT applications (e.g. 
security awareness training systems) in order to improve their perceived values (Agrawal 
et al., 2003) and adoption (Montealegre, 1998). 
Many security concerns are common to users worldwide. However, the importance 
of security concerns varies with countries. For instance, training to increase the 
awareness of intellectual property is more important in developed countries than in 
developing countries. As an example, the New York State Parent Teachers Association 
in the USA is actively raising the security awareness of creating a safe, family-friendly 
internet environment both inside and outside of the home (PR Newswire, 2007). 
Countries of the world establish different codes of conduct related to the use of 
information and communication technologies in order to improve IS security 
awareness and ethics (Bia and Kalika, 2007). The increase of security awareness and 
cautious behavior at the individual-level can improve the information security 
performance of an organization (Albrechtsen, 2007). Thus, the focus of security 
awareness training must be developed according to the needs of users in different 
countries and cultures. 
 
2.2 Situational learning to improve security awareness 
The “human” factor is the weakest link in information security and the cause of many 
security threats, according to NIST-SP-800-50 (Wilson and Hash, 2003). Most users do 
not have adequate security traits and are not sensitive to information security threats 
in their surrounding environment. An organization can potentially protect itself from 
security threats by  simply  improving a user’s  level of security awareness in their 
working   environment. 
The design of an effective information security awareness program needs to solicit 
user opinions and increase the degree of user involvement (Albrechtsen, 2007). Unclear 
security requirements of users can result in the confusion between security 
requirements and architectural security mechanisms from the systems development 
perspective (Tondel et al., 2008). Consequently, users may learn security awareness 
topics in general, rather than apply them in their surroundings to secure themselves 
and their organizations if their roles and security requirements are not clearly 
specified. Security awareness is role-based learning, detailing the roles and 
responsibilities of a user in the use of IT systems within an organization. Through 
the use of training and education users can learn the necessary skills and knowledge to 
perform IT security control activities. 
Situational awareness makes users aware of their surroundings as well as the 
environmental elements and their contextual meanings (Endsley, 1995). Facilitating 
this awareness in their working environment allows users to form a mental model to 
 
 
 
both understand the current risks of a situation and to predict and possibly prevent the 
potential adverse effects of these risks. Mental models are “mechanisms whereby 
humans are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations of 
system functioning and observed system states, and prediction of future states” (Rouse 
and Morris, 1985, p. 7). A complete mental model of security awareness is to be aware 
of different forms of security threats, understand how these threats work and predict 
potential outcomes of allowing them to continue. The awareness is about the 
perceptions of security threats, since not all of them are so obvious. A user with a 
higher security awareness level can better sense impending security threats. Laptop 
theft and run-of-the-mill virus infections are two typical security incidents that can 
easily be prevented and minimized if users learn to lock their computer and use 
anti-virus software to check suspicious emails. These two security incidents alone 
account for US $20 million of loss, according to a 2006 Computer Security Institute/US 
Federal Bureau of Investigation survey with 131 respondents (Gordon et al., 2006). 
This is the rudimentary form of a mental model that can be derived from the 
situational awareness-learning program. Perceptions can arouse interest, thereby 
leading to a greater understanding about how the identified threats function. 
Comprehension is the second level of learning outcomes resulting from situational 
learning programs. Previous knowledge or experience that is related to the 
environment can help more efficiently form a coherent mental model of the studied 
subjects (Dominguez et al., 1994) and take appropriate plan of actions to cope with 
situations (Sarter and Woods, 1991; Fracker, 1991). Situational training based on 
scenarios enables users to accumulate learning experience and respond to security 
threats. Situational learning is an effective user-centered learning approach that 
improves the perception, comprehension and projection ability of users to secure their 
surroundings (Endsley and Garland, 2000). 
 
2.3 Cultural influence to the design of security awareness programs as work systems 
Technical and social systems can contribute to and are included in the formation of a 
work system (Schoderbek et al., 1985). The inputs of socio-technical systems include 
processes, tasks, and technology (Kavan et al., 1999), whereas those of social systems 
deal with  intangible  attributes  of  members  within  the  work  systems.  Intangible 
attributes include values, skills, and attitudes. Culture influences both sub-systems. 
To optimize the functions of the work system, both sub-systems also need to be 
optimized based on the cultural differences. A work system that is effective in one 
culture does not necessarily guarantee its effectiveness in other cultures (Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988). A cursory examination of the popular mobile music applications adopted 
across countries shows that more than 60 percent of cellular phone users in Korea 
regularly use these applications, but less than 20 percent of American users are doing 
so (Wireless Asia, 2005). Mobile gamblers from Asia Pacific and Europe represent 
more than 75 percent of mobile gambling expenditures among other countries of the 
world (Gibson, 2006). All these evidences clearly indicate that both technical and social 
systems need to be considered in order to help better understand how to optimize their 
synergy (Huse and Cummings, 1985). Incorporating the cultural element into the 
design of a technical system can increase the odds of designing a more secure system. 
Situational security awareness training immerses an individual into his/her familiar 
environment to improve the efficiency of processing information. To successfully 
 
 
 
 
implement the training, it is important to align the cultural factors (values, beliefs, and 
assumptions) of users with the managerial practices (Hofstede, 1993; Kirkman and 
Shapiro, 1997). Therefore, it is plausible that situational security awareness training is 
a more efficient alternative than the traditional face-to-face training in improving 
security awareness levels. 
The focus of this study is to investigate whether or not situational security 
awareness training is culturally-bounded. Important exploratory directions are to 
understand: 
● whether people from a particular culture are more receptive to this training 
approach than people from another culture; and 
● which cultural dimension plays an important role to moderate or mediate users’ 
learning performance receiving this training approach in order to improve their 
security  awareness  levels. 
 
2.4 Security awareness levels of general users vary with four cultural dimensions 
Hofstede (1993) study on the four intercultural dimensions of individualism, power 
distance, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance lays the groundwork for many social 
studies that are interested in learning cultural impacts on their areas, ranging from 
education, politics, economics, motivation patterns, leadership, conflict resolutions 
(Hoppe, 2004), to innovations adoption (Van Everdingen and Waarts, 2003). Each 
dimension is measurable with a specific indicator. A high individualism indicator 
(IDV) pertains to a culture in which in-group relationships are weak and not cohesive. 
USA (IDV 91), Australia (90), and Great Britain (89) are in the extreme of high 
individualism cultures, whereas Taiwan (17) and Guatemala (6) are in the other 
extreme of low individualism or high collectivism cultures. A high power distance 
indicator (PDI) pertains to a culture in which the tolerance level of social inequality is 
higher. Countries in the category of high PDI include Malaysia (PDI 104), Mexico 
(81), and India (77). Low PDI cultures include Austria (11), Israel (13), and Ireland (22). 
A  high  masculinity  indicator  (MAS)  pertains  to  a  culture  in  which  men  are 
decision-makers and more assertive. A low MAS pertains to a culture in which gender 
is seen as more neutral in nature. High MAS cultures include Japan (MAS 95), 
Austria (79), where as low MAS cultures are Sweden (5) and Denmark (16). A high 
uncertainty avoidance indicator (UAI) pertains to a culture in which people feel unsafe 
and has urgent need for structured and written rules to avoid uncertainty. High UAI 
cultures include Greece (UAI 112), Japan (92), and France (86), whereas low UAI 
cultures include Singapore (8) and Denmark (23). 
People in different cultures have different levels of security sensitivity depending 
upon their social and technical environments. These socio-technical backgrounds 
have resulted in the formation of varying security awareness levels of general users of 
security risks. Due to differences in information communications and 
telecommunication infrastructure, varying forms of security risks (e.g. external, 
internal, virtual, physical, and natural risks) have been formed and adapted. This has 
gradually shaped the way public users perceive and respond to security threats. 
Table I maps organizational and individual security awareness levels with 
Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions: individualism, power distance, masculinity, and 
uncertainty avoidance. The mapping exercise is our attempt to show potential 
correlation between cultural dimensions and the security awareness levels at both 
 
 
 
individual and organizational levels based on literature review. This observation can 
provide us a certain degree of confidence in proposing our propositions and hypotheses 
in the following section. Taking the IDI dimension as an example, individuals in high IDI 
cultures are self-oriented and they believe in individual decisions and are encouraged to 
take initiatives (McCoy et al., 2005). Security awareness is a user-involvement exercise 
as previous evidences indicated. As such, high IDI individuals care about their personal 
privacy and know that the government has little roles to play in protecting personal 
privacy. They know the increase of security awareness is their personal responsibility. 
In contrast, personal privacy right needs to be yielded to government if the collective 
interests of the society as a whole are greater than the personal privacy. The Peoples 
Republic of China government requested the cooperation of multinational enterprises, 
such as Google, to release personal communication records about an individual citizen 
suspected of violating national interests. These two examples show a clear contrast that 
individual security awareness level is higher in the high IDI culture than in the low IDI 
culture. 
However, organizational security awareness levels could be providing a contrary 
evidence because low IDI individuals know that the organization or the government 
that they work for are monitoring all suspicious activities. The centralized control of 
personal privacy entrusts an organization with more confidence in controlling and 
managing each individual in order to optimize the collective interests. Therefore, 
organizational security awareness levels in the low IDI culture can be relatively higher 
than in the high IDI culture. 
In the realm of security management, individualism and power distance are two 
salient cultural dimensions that go hand-in-hand. In addition, they each can have 
potential influence on the security awareness levels at both individual- and 
organizational-levels but we choose to focus our investigation on determining if the 
IDI cultural dimension has any particular influence on the effectiveness of security 
awareness training programs. 
 
2.5 High individualists have a higher individual, but lower organizational security 
awareness level 
To validate our propositions that information security awareness levels of people vary 
with their culture, we first examine the relationship between the individualistic culture 
and security awareness level. The goal of this study is to propose hypotheses to test if 
situational security awareness programs have varying effects on the improvement of 
security awareness levels of general users. If so, are people from high individualistic 
 
 
 
Organizational 
security awareness 
level 
 
Individual security 
awareness level 
 
 High Low High Low Table I. 
IDI (individualism)  X X  Organizational vs 
PDI (power distance) X   X individual security 
MAS (masculinity) X  X  awareness levels along 
UAI (uncertainty avoidance) X  X  four culture dimensions 
 
 
 
cultures more receptive to situational awareness training programs than people from 
low individualistic culture? 
Individualists (Americans) react more positively to job insecurity, whereas 
collectivists (Chinese) react negatively (Probst and Lawler, 2006). President Bush’s 
plan to privatize the social security system was deeply rooted in the individualism 
culture, according to the Democratic senator Max Baucus (Harrington, 2005). Online 
behaviors are another form of individualism-collectivism culture.  Collectivists 
(e.g. Japan and Turkey) have a predisposition to associate security issues with 
financial risks, whereas individualists (USA, UK, and Denmark) are inclined to accept 
security as a part of products or services (including quality, convenience and 
satisfaction) or privacy issues (Kucuk, 2002). For this reason, collectivists are less 
receptive to online individual banking, because its perceived risks are higher than 
traditional physical banking (Charbaji and Jannoun, 2005). 
The influence of individualism culture has altered the perceptions of security and 
technology to secure individual and organizational assets. Individualists have a higher 
tolerance of risks and are more willing to adopt security technology. In comparison 
with the traditional F2F training approach, situational awareness training is  a more 
innovative and unproven approach. Individualists are more likely to perceive the 
usefulness of this training approach and appreciate its potentials However, at the 
organizational level; individualists need to work collectively in order to cope with 
security risks. When asked to try new security training approaches, it is very likely 
that low individualists resist the adoption of this technology because they consider the 
adoption as part of individual responsibilities. 
The purpose of security awareness programs is to strengthen the “people” factors as 
the weak point of information security and a primary link to many security threats 
(Wilson and Hash, 2003). Users who are not sensitive to guard and dissuade 
information security threats in their surrounding environment can put the entire 
organization at risk. An immediate measure to toughen the “people” link is to 
improve three levels of security awareness of general users. Unlike training and 
education, the purpose of security awareness is to instill the skills into users to perform 
IT security control activities. Rather, users need to first be aware of security 
vulnerabilities  in  their  surroundings,  and  then  predict  future  happenings  of 
security incidences due to these vulnerabilities, and then take actions to  resolve 
security breaches if they happen (Endsley, 1995). In other words, an effective security 
awareness program can lead users in forming a mental model to understand  the present 
state of the security risks. Moreover, users are able to predict potential adverse effects 
of these risks and to minimize these effects should they surface. These three levels 
of security awareness can be increased in the ordered manner via an effective 
security  awareness  program. 
The effectiveness of the situational training approach adopted in this study to improve 
these three levels of security awareness can potentially vary the degree of individualism 
culture because of the unique nature of “felt-involvement” embedded in this training 
approach. Situational and intrapersonal are two important elements of the 
“felt-involvement” feature (Richins and Bloch, 1986). Situational awareness training is 
to deliberately create a “felt-involvement” learning atmosphere so that users can easily 
immerse themselves into the security situations. The atmosphere of customer 
involvement  is  an  effective  agent  for  customer  acquisition  and  retention  in  the 
 
 
 
Marketing arena, and the improvement  of customer’s purchasing intention (Batra and 
Ray, 1986). A coherent mental model about the studied subjects can be further 
constructed in the minds of users to ease the comprehension process (Dominguez et al., 
1994). 
We suspect that high individualists are more likely to be receptive to situational 
awareness learning than low individualists because the “felt involvement” feature 
creates less cognitive pressure on learners and ease the comprehension process. As the 
comprehension  process  is   improved,   projection   and   actions-taking   process   can 
be enhanced correspondingly. We therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H1.   Security awareness levels. 
H1a. High individualists have a higher first level of security awareness than low 
individualists after receiving the situational training approach. 
H1b. High individualists have a higher second level of security awareness than 
low individualists after receiving the situational training approach. 
H1c. High individualists have a higher third level of security awareness than low 
individualists after receiving the situational training approach. 
 
3. Research methodology 
This study used Macromedia Flash as the application to develop an animation-based 
security awareness program based on Endsleys’ (1995) Situational Awareness 
Dynamic Decision Making Model and Situation Awareness Global Assessment 
Techniques. Experimental sessions were conducted with 160 Taiwanese and 100 
American subjects to assess if culture is a relevant element to be considered 
when adopting situational security awareness programs. To understand the 
moderating effect of culture, we compared results collected from two separate 
studies in the USA and Taiwan with respect to the impact of situational vs traditional 
security awareness programs on the improvement of three levels of security 
awareness. This manipulation control makes it possible to detect the effects of the 
single independent variable (training method) on training outcomes. With the training 
method as a control factor, any significant differences between these two studies 
indicate that the exogenous factors of computer self-efficacy, pre-test security 
awareness levels, and culture exist. 
 
3.1 Course materials 
Two security awareness topics were popular with general users: password usage 
and desktop security. A user needs to know how to create a strong password which would 
consist of a combination of a certain length, numbers, alpha characters, upper and lower 
case letters as well as the need to make frequent changes to protect his/her password. 
The scope of desktop security includes the use of screen savers, preventing the 
viewing of information on a computer screen, battery backup devices, and access 
control, according to NIST-SP-800-50. The authors developed course materials 
concerning the two aforementioned topic areas while narrowing our research only to 
one subtopic from each area: 
● creating a secure password (Figure 1); and 
● protecting the physical assets of information that may appear on a desktop. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
Creating a secure 
password 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 
Protecting physical assets 
of information on a 
desktop 
A situational learning environment was created that would allow the deliverance of 
these two subtopics (Figure 2). 
 
 
3.2 Measurement design 
The measurements of this study are comprised of an evaluation of computer efficacy 
and three levels of information security awareness. A pretest was conducted to assess 
participants’ computer efficacy with the survey questionnaire instrument including 
questions related to computer-related knowledge and existing security awareness 
levels. After participants received learning sessions, they participated in a post-test to 
assess their learning performance in each of the three levels of security awareness. 
Two security experts who are certified with BS7799 security management certificates 
and two scholars who teach information security courses were invited to modify the 
survey questionnaire. Native US speakers assisted with the translation of course, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
materials from Chinese to English in order to accommodate the needs of the American 
students. 
Two groups of college students were exposed to situational and traditional face-
to-face learning approaches to assimilate security awareness topics. Three levels of 
learning outcomes were measured at the end of a one-hour learning session. 
In order to clearly understand if the training approach contributes to the difference 
in learning outcomes, subjects were also required to fill out survey questionnaires to 
self-report their computer self-efficacy and prior experiences related to security 
training. In addition, subjects are given a scenario to assess their response actions to 
security threats. 
 
 
3.3 Experimental subjects and procedures 
One hundred and sixty sophomores from a private university in Taiwan participated 
in the first round of this study. Another one hundred juniors from a public state 
university in the USA attended the second round. We deliberately compared the US 
with  Taiwanese  subjects  because  American  subjects  are  high  individualists 
(IDV 91) and Taiwanese subjects are low individualists (IDV 17). The intent 
of this design is to increase the effect size so as to help us control the magnitude of 
moderating influence of the individualism culture on the relationship between 
situational awareness and learning outcomes. Effect size is a family of indices to 
measure the magnitude of influence of a treatment effect (Lipsey and Wilson, 1993). 
Each group of subjects was equally divided into one of two groups: experimental or 
control group. Subjects from the experimental group received the situational learning 
while other subjects from the control group  received  the traditional face-to-face 
learning method. Instructors used Microsoft PowerPoint to present the same course 
materials used in the flash-based situational learning in slides. It has been commonly 
known that the learning outcomes of face-to-face instructions can largely depend upon 
the instructor. We took this potential effect into consideration and had the same 
instructor lecture students in the face-to-face instruction mode for American and 
Taiwanese subjects, respectively. The “felt-involvement” feature is missing from this 
step-by-step instruction. For instance, the instructor first explained what constitutes a 
weak password in a presentation slide. Then the instructors enlisted all passwords that 
are considered as a weak control, such as using their birthday as a password, not 
mixing alpha characters with numbers, and writing down passwords and sticking 
them on a computer screen. Instructors further provided instructions on how to secure 
passwords and suggested some actions to reset passwords if they were lost. Tables II 
and III show the distribution of subjects receiving situational or face-to-face training at 
Taiwan and the US sites, respectively. American subjects were not equally divided 
because we randomized these two treatments by class. Four classes participated in this 
study, with a total of 40 students of two classes receiving situational learning and a 
total of 60 students of two other classes receiving the traditional face-to-face 
instruction. All subjects received 30 min sessions. This counter-group design can help 
identify if a situational learning approach is better than a traditional F2F learning 
approach at improving the level of security awareness for general users. 
 
 
 
 
 
Group 
 
Number of 
subjects Pretest 
 
Learning 
approach Post-test 
 
 
 
Experimental group (situational training) 
MIS major 40 Computer 
efficacy 
 
Situational 
learning 
 
Information security awareness 
measurements 
Scenario 
    International 
business major 40 
Control group 
Table II. 
Experimental design at 
MIS major 40 Computer 
efficacy 
Traditional 
F2F 
Information  security  awareness 
measurements 
the Taiwan site IB major 40 Scenario 
Group 
Number of 
subjects Pre-test 
Learning 
approach Post-test 
 
 Experimental group  
Business  Computer Situational Information security awareness 
major 40 efficacy learning measurements 
Table III. 
Experimental design at 
Control group 
Business 
 
Computer Traditional Information security awareness 
the US site majors 66 efficacy F2F measurements 
 
4. Statistical data analysis 
4.1 Pre-test analysis 
Table IV shows that both the experimental and control groups at the Taiwan site are not 
significantly different related to general computer efficacy. However, subjects in the 
experimental group appear to have a significantly higher level of security awareness 
than subjects majoring in International Business with the p value 0.000 (, 0.01). 
In contrast, at the US site Table V also detects a significant difference between the 
situational learning group and traditional learning group in the security awareness 
level. The computer efficacy in general does not vary very much between the 
experimental and control groups. Samples from both the US and Taiwan sites have 
many resemblances. This commonality of the experimental setting in both countries is 
 
 
 
Computer efficacy Security awareness 
 
 
Table IV. 
t-test analysis for low 
individualists 
(Taiwanese) 
p-value 0.569 
Notes: p , 0.05 ( *) significant; p , 0.01( * *) very significant 
 Sample size Mean SD Mean SD 
Experimental group 80 25.50 4.27 30.20 2.83 
Control group 80 24.55 3.86 25.46 4.64 
Levene test F 0.325  11.783 0.001 ***    
 
 
 
 
 
 
a good control to assess if different training approaches can enlarge the differences in 
training outcomes. It should be noted that the experimental group in both countries 
tend to have a higher security awareness level before receiving situational trainings. 
The constraint may aggravate the researching findings in either direction, such as 
situational training is very effective or not ineffective. However, if the researching 
findings at both sites go to the opposing direction our argument to either support or 
reject the usefulness of situational security awareness training to high individualists is 
more convincing. With this logic in mind, the following section will examine the 
learning outcomes after having experimental and control groups receive situational 
and traditional security awareness training. 
 
4.2 Post-test analysis 
Table VI indicates that after receiving either situational or traditional security 
awareness training, no significant differences in all three levels of security awareness 
exist between the two groups at the Taiwan site. This indicates that  situational 
learning does not deliver its anticipated benefits in improving general users’ 
perception, comprehension and projection ability. Control groups that received the 
traditional training approach  can  perform  as  well  as  the  experimental  groups  that 
are equipped  with  better  security  awareness  before  the  training  session  took  place. 
In contrast, situational security awareness training at the US site does help the 
experimental group surpass the control group in the measurements of all three security 
awareness levels (Table VII). 
The Anova test (Table VII) shows that these three performance metrics are all 
significant ( p 0.000 for perception; p 0.007 for comprehension; and p 0.009 for 
projection). This indicates that the group of subjects receiving situational awareness 
 
 
 
 
Computer efficacy Pre-test awareness 
 
 
 
 
Notes: p , 0.05 ( *) significant; p , 0.01( * *) very significant 
Table V. 
t-test analysis for high 
individualists 
(Americans) 
 
 
 
 
Group Size Mean SD Levene  test t p 
Post-test awareness 
 
 
 
 
Notes: p , 0.05 ( *) significant; p , 0.01( * *) very significant 
Table   VI. 
Measures of dependent 
variables between 
experimental and control 
groups at Taiwan site 
 
 
 Sample size Mean SD Mean SD 
Experimental group 34 6.38 0.70 5.69 0.59 
Control group 66 5.95 0.90 5.26 0.70 
Levene test F 0.001  9.56  
 p-value 0.978  0.003 **   
 
SA1 Experimental 80 25.61 3.79 2.121 0.147 20.255 0.799 
 Control 80 25.48 2.99     
SA2 Experimental 80 24.35 4.28 0.003 0.957 21.333 0.184 
 Control 80 23.46 4.14     
SA3 Experimental 80 28.53 3.27 0.96 0.757 20.539 0.590 
 Control 80 28.25 3.18     
 
 
 
 
training outperformed the traditional group. In addition, the situational awareness 
training approach is indeed a more effective training approach than the traditional 
approach at helping general users improve their security awareness levels. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
American users who received the situational security awareness training outperformed 
those who received the traditional step-by-step instruction. In contrast, Taiwanese 
users of both experimental and controllable groups had similar performances after 
receiving respective training approaches. Since the research findings at both sites go in 
the opposing direction, we are confident in stating that situational security awareness 
training is more useful and effective to high individualists than high collectivists. 
As seen below in (Table VIII), H1a-H1c are supported in the US site, whereas those 
hypotheses were rejected in the Taiwanese site. 
These findings confirm the potential influence of the individualism culture as a 
socio-technical factor concerning the improvement of knowledge surrounding the topic 
of security awareness. Our study further suggests that the cultural trait, particularly 
the individualism cultural dimension, is a strong dispositional predictor of the efficacy 
of situational training applied in the context of security awareness improvement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VII. 
Measures of dependent 
variables between 
experimental and control 
groups at the US site 
 
 
 
Note: p , 0.05 ( *) significant; p , 0.01( * *) very significant 
 
 
 
 
Security 
awareness levels Hypotheses US site Taiwan site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VIII. 
Summary of hypotheses 
testing 
 
SA2 H1b. High individualists have a 
higher second level of security 
awareness than low 
individualists after receiving 
the situational training 
approach 
SA3 H1c. High individualists have a 
higher third level of security 
awareness than low 
individualists after receiving 
the situational training 
approach 
Supported 
( p 0.007 , 0.01) 
 
 
Supported 
( p 0.009 , 0.01) 
Rejected 
( p 0.184 . 0.05) 
 
 
Rejected 
( p 0.590 . 0.05) 
 Group Size Mean SD F-value p 
Post-test 
SA1 
awareness 
Experimental 
 
34 
 
6.30 
 
0.74 
 
13.40 
 
0.000 **  
 Control 66 5.70 0.80   
SA2 Experimental 34 6.27 0.58 7.568 0.007 **  
 Control 66 5.84 0.83   
SA3 Experimental 34 6.45 0.62 7.15 0.009 **  
 Control 66 6.06 0.72   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The positive influence of the individualism culture also corroborates with the finding 
in the field of consumer behavior that high individualists have a higher intention than 
high collectivists to purchase personalized products in an online retailing situation 
(Moon et al., 2008). This culture trait also exhibits its influence on the trust formation. 
For instance, a trustee’s perceived ability and integrity are the source of trust to 
individualists and predictability as benevolent interactions are to collectivists (Branzei 
et al., 2007). The positive correlation between individualism culture and the efficiency 
of situational awareness programs has some commonalities between the topics of 
cultural traits and the acceptance of consumer goods, which in fact involves the fast 
formation of trust. 
It makes no significant difference for collectivists to receive either situational 
awareness or step-by-step instruction. However, situational awareness programs make 
individualists aware of their surroundings as well as the environmental elements and 
their contextual meanings in a more efficient and effective manner. Situational 
awareness programs are also an effective vehicle to help individualists form a mental 
model to both understand the current risks of a situation and to predict and possibly 
prevent the potential adverse effects of security risks and vulnerabilities. 
We administered a pre-test for both American and Taiwanese subjects before they 
were exposed to both the situational awareness and traditional face-to-face treatments. 
The purpose of this pre-test was to evaluate and minimize the impacts of extraneous 
factors, such as age differences, computer efficacy, experience, ethnical heterogeneity 
or family profiles. Students from universities in both the US and Taiwan are either 
juniors or seniors. They are all full-time students, with the studied American students 
in a public university and the Taiwanese students in a private university. About 99 
percent of American students are Caucasian, and 100 percent of students from Taiwan 
are native Taiwanese. Therefore, the potential impact of ethnical diversity is minimal. 
It is highly probable that all the variables this study deliberately controlled have 
negligible effects on learning outcomes. We are confident that the impact of 
individualism culture on the efficacy of situational awareness learning does exist and 
needs to be paid attention to. 
 
6. Conclusions and future research 
Security awareness is an important issue that all individuals must be concerned with 
as information is transferred around the globe. Global citizens also react differently to 
security awareness as would be expected due to differing cultures and the emphasis 
that is placed on individualism. Certainly, awareness of the risks and safeguards is the 
first line of defense that can be employed by any individual, but how individuals 
address these risks can be very dissimilar in different cultures. 
Through the use of different testing results at Taiwan and the US sites, the present 
cultural implications and opportunities for suggest future research. As we have seen, 
low individualists appear less receptive to situational awareness training than high 
individualists. More specifically, high individualists have a higher level of security 
awareness than low individualists after receiving situational training. 
For other cultures the question and future research remains “How do we best or 
most effectively train individuals in relation to security awareness?” Though the 
answer is currently not known within the international arena, more research may be 
able to provide this answer. 
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